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“We live in an everyday that is saturated with surveillance. 
It is a major shift from an earlier era where surveillance was 
something one experienced in specific places and under the 
gaze of one person or thing.”1
Introduction
Just like Nayar described it, surveillance is no longer concentrated to very 
contained spaces under the watchful eye of a handful of people. Surveillance 
is no longer limited to a panopticon-like tower – it is a true “surveilling assem-
blage”. The model suggested by Jeremy Bentham no longer describes the sur-
veillance status quo because it’s too neat and straightforward. Two traces that 
seem absent in the processing of personal information in modern times, where 
blurred mass surveillance reaches everyone and everything.
Nonetheless, the United Nations (UN) have systematically affirmed2 that a 
person’s right to privacy forbids arbitrary or unlawful interference. Any violation 
should be sanctioned by law, in line with Articles 12 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights3 and 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights4.
This can strike an external onlooker as rather odd. In this clash between 
muddled surveillance and the forthright resolutions of the UN, what prevails? 
Considering that most surveillance systems, formal or informal, are effective 
more by the “lingering threat” that individuals might be under their gaze rather 
than being actually monitored5, modern technologies can threaten the exercise 
of every individual right and freedom.
1 nayaR (2015), p. 6.
2 It was most recently included in the first articles of the UN’s Resolution of the General Assembly A/
RES/71/199, adopted on 19 December 2016 (65th plenary meeting), and of the Resolution of the Human 
Rights Council A/HRC/RES/34/7, adopted on 23 March 2017 (56th meeting). This is a renewal of prior texts, 
namely the Resolutions of the General Assembly A/RES/69/166, adopted on 18 December 2014 (73rd 
plenary meeting), A/RES/68/167, adopted on 18 December 2013 (70th plenary meeting), and A/RES/2450 
(XXIII), adopted on 19 December 1968 (1748th plenary meeting). It had also been addressed in the Resolu-
tions of the Human Rights Council A/HRC/RES/31/7, adopted on 23 March 2016 (62nd meeting), A/HRC/
RES/28/16, adopted on 26 March 2015 (28th session), and A/HRC/RES/26/13, adopted on 26 June 2014 
(38th meeting).
3 Which reads that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or 
correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of 
the law against such interference or attacks”, according to the Resolution A/RES/3/217 A (III), adopted on 
10 December 1948 (183rd plenary meeting).
4 This Article, part of the annex of the Resolution A/RES/21/2200 (XXI), adopted on 16 December 1966 
(1496th plenary meeting), copies the text of the Universal Declaration.
5 iRion (2015), p. 81.
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Watchful technologies seem to be creeping into our daily lives. They are be-
coming a part of what it means to live in cities and to interact with others. They 
are turning into an element of our modern cultures and we can no longer live 
without them. However, most of us seem “intolerant” to them when we realize 
how much a random day can be populated by technologies that monitor and 
register our movements. There is a difficult appeal to compromise here. This pa-
per addresses the notion of consent as key to understand our social behaviors, 
thus explaining the phenomenon we are experiencing.
This research aims precisely at reflecting on what’s happening regarding 
surveillance from a composite standpoint: it puts together legal analysis with 
technological and sociological reasoning. It is not aiming at solving problems – it 
is up to authorities and agencies to ponder on the ideas presented here and turn 
them into action. As such, there are two main goals in this paper, besides clarify-
ing the modern “surveillance reality”. The first is to explain how and why surveil-
lance is crawling (and not even on tiptoes) into every aspect of existence, from 
governmental programs to personal affairs. Through the concept of consent, 
seldom used in related literature, this paper will probably come closer to more 
accurate answers. The second, shaped as the main conclusion, is a suggestion 
for a brighter future. Considering that certain facts will remain regardless we like 
them, it is through introducing surveillance techniques in the sustainable devel-
opment discourse that we can arrive at a better social environment. This does 
not amount to confusing matters, namely hard and human sciences; because 
sustainable development has a social side and surveillance, data protection, pri-
vacy, and the use of technology are very much key elements in out societal mod-
ern lives. Accountability, transparency, and preemptive scrutiny are just some 
of the components that will make present and future surveillance apparatuses 
sustainable in our communities.
This work is divided in 5 sections. It begins by illustrating a random day to 
make the reader grasp the perspective guiding the argument. Then it engages 
with the concept of surveillance and introduces some reasoning of using mon-
itoring apparatuses in the public discourse. The following part tries to briefly 
deconstruct the persistent nothing-to-hide argument and makes the bridge to 
the private use of surveillance, a section which highlights some of the perils of 
trusting and consenting to commercial policies. Finally, my research into consent 
becoming a cultural feature of modernity is dealt with in the last segment. The 
main argument, as mentioned before, is that surveillance is not an inevitability 
but a useful tool that should be wielded sustainably. In fact, sustainability is the 
“unexpected” answer in a project that started looking only at the problem but 
that later aspired to move further towards a solution.
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A normal day 
In our daily lives, it’s hard to avoid being under the prying eye of any tech-
nological gadget6. Just like in Stephen King’s Under the Dome novel of 2009, 
the idea of an “omniscient eye of the Supreme Being” is present in the form of 
technical surveillance in the 21st century because human beings have an obses-
sion for watching and spying one another7. As I am writing this text, I am well 
aware that the internal camera on my computer is pointing directly to my face. Its 
silent gaze menacingly remembering me that someone can be watching behind 
that little dark circle, almost imperceptible in the black framing of the desktop. 
In fact, its invisibility is almost a cynical metaphor for what might be happening 
in the shadows of the electronic circuits connecting my MacBook to someone 
sitting halfway across the globe in Cupertino, California. And I suspect it’s not 
only when this dot prickles to life that they might see me. Whoever they may be.
Let’s picture a random day to get a sense of some Information Technologies 
(ITs) that can be used to trace our steps daily – just to put things in context and 
with no intention of exhaustion. You wake up and snooze the alarm clock of your 
smartphone – this is one of the most obvious tracking devices that comes to 
mind as we can no longer live without these tiny computers. Smartphones are 
incorporated with a Global Positioning System (GPS) microchip that is constant-
ly active, even if the device is disconnected. Some systems allow for the disa-
bling of the location caching8, but other don’t. Or make it harder. Numerous web 
forums discuss the relentless quest for GPS service by some apps, even if not 
directly concerned with navigation functions. From weather forecasts to restau-
rant hints, the fact is that sooner or later you’re bound to turn your location sys-
tem on again, making big brother resume its faithful activity of being on to you.
Phones have normally inset also both a camera and a microphone, used so 
often for vocally WhatsApp – an app like so many others that have requirements 
for proper functioning, like checking your location or connecting to a mailing 
account. Either way, whenever you move or log in, the system will know and 
the information will go to a main server. All these technologies can tell you, and 
someone else, where you are, what you see, and what you say. And you haven’t 
even showered yet.
While taking breakfast you probably have the television on to check the 
morning news. The most recent TVs can be (optionally) connected to the 
6 A futuristic and more unsettling account than the one described here can be found in the engaging 
lines of tudGe (2010), pp. 11 ff.
7 nayaR (2015), p. 2.
8 GoRdon (2011).
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internet. Your provider will know you turned it on and what you decided to watch 
to make a commercial profile and draft a channel audience share. This enables 
the company to personalize your newsletter to specific needs, either yours or 
theirs. Live monitoring through the “idiot box” can also happen when you have a 
model with an embedded camera and microphone. 
Certain people tape every piece of hardware to block unwanted viewers and 
muffle sound-recording. The rate of success is, obviously, unknown and unac-
countable. Computers are some of the best examples of this; they are obvious 
devices when it comes to e-surveillance. Practically everything we do related to 
study, businesses, or social life involves computers and phones. You will turn 
your computer on during the day and be sure to leave a record behind you. Even 
if you delete it regularly, some programs remember your every keystroke, keep 
your passwords, and report on technical errors — but some will unsuspectedly 
and politely ask you first.
If you use your company or university’s device, there will be an IT guy poten-
tially surveilling or controlling it from an ethereal room hardly anyone has paid a 
visit to. You will remember him only when the system crashes but he will know 
what you do whenever he feels like it. When using an institutional card, the data 
administrators/controllers will also know where and when you’ve been and if you 
have the right to open this or that door. But it’s not only at your workplace these 
cards exist: at the gym, the swimming pool, or the unsuspected supermarket.
To withdraw money from an automatic machine, you need clearance and 
approval from your Bank. It will obviously know when you need some extra funds 
in your pocket or decide to pay anything with a card. The banking and automat-
ed teller machine systems will generate a response to your request according 
to the account settings and other conditions. Usually, a Closed Circuit Television 
(CCTV) resembling the little circle on my computer or in the shape of mirror-like 
metals is placed on every machine for your safety and security. Remember to 
smile as someone might be smiling back.
Public (and more and more private) enclosed systems for surveilling through 
video cameras are the most visible means of monitoring. They are usually at 
the core of fora on public security policies. CCTV exists since 19429. Today, it 
is the prototype of technologically organized monitoring10, being widely spread 
in every metropolis, whether inside11, at the doors of buildings, or in the streets. 
9 tudGe (2010), p. 83.
10 leMan-lanGlois & laRivièRe-BélanGeR (2011), p. 157.
11 There is yet little empirical evidence on surveillance in certain mixed (both private and public) areas 
such as schools but, according to tayloR (2012), pp. 228-229, the few studies conducted on surveillance 
there have shown it “undermines privacy, erodes trust, makes pupils feel criminalized and can have a ‘chill-
ing effect’ on creativity and interaction”.
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Depending on where you live, your days can be reconstructed based on digi-
tal images recorded by CCTV alone. London is the most “spied-on city in the 
world”, topping New York and Beijing, with approximately 51,000 cameras, 
mostly located at the entry points of the capital’s core12.
Getting home can be an exercise in surveillance as well. Apart from cameras 
in public buildings, hotels, shopping areas, stadiums, museums, banks, main 
avenues and squares, public transportation are required to have inbuilt cameras. 
If they don’t, your monthly pass has a microchip that can be used to trace your 
whereabouts13. And if you walk home, you can get caught in anecdotal ways. 
Imagine Google Maps is updating their data or a drone is flying by to make a 
breathtaking video for some advertisement. Be careful not to be in the wrong 
place at the wrong time.
At home, you go online through your highly-suspicious (yet taped) computer. 
The only real guaranty when accessing the internet is probably e-surveillance. 
Facebook, for instance, declares that they “are passionate about creating en-
gaging and customized experiences for people”, i.e., looking what you are up to. 
For that, they collect: i ) things you do and information you provide; ii ) things oth-
ers do and info they provide; iii ) your networks and connections; iv) intelligence 
about payments; v) device data, namely attributes, location, and connection; vi ) 
input from websites and apps that use their services; vii ) info from third-party 
partners; and viii ) something else from their own companies. As the Nespresso 
ad goes, what else?14
If you decide to go on a short trip to get away from all these meddling ITs, 
big brother will go along15. To make it simple, you decide to check flights online 
12 World Atlas (2017). According to lloyd (2011), p. 6, there are about 4.2 million CCTVs operating in the 
United Kingdom, about a quarter of global installations, which makes an average of about one camera per 
14 inhabitants, and it is estimated that a person can be “caught” on camera about 300 times a day. For an 
account on the growth of CCTV in the UK and other countries in Europe, see noRRis (2012), pp. 252 ff.
13 According to lloyd (2011), pp. 3-4, London’s “Oyster cards” have been one of the main sources 
of information for law enforcement agents in this metropolitan area, particularly for the long time-span of 
eight weeks during which the commuters’ journeys are recorded and the fact that some of these passes 
carry the user’s personal identification. To make people adhere to this data-collector system, the transport 
authorities even raised the price of paper tickets and lowered that of such cards, creating a true monopoly 
of access to public transportation in the city [tudGe (2010), pp. 89-90].
14 According to thelWall (2013), p. 75, internet content can be less ephemeral than first thought regard-
ing personal information and communication as much online material is copied into the Internet Archive, 
available at archive.org (11.10.2017), or similar databases, namely those created by the website owners or 
administrators. Facebook, for instance, stores deleted profiles and retains them as suspended until activa-
tion by the user for, allegedly, marketing purposes.
15 A barely novel yet still controversial technology that can also come along are radio frequency identi-
fication structures. These consist of implanting nano-microchips under the skin or in personal belongings 
containing personal data and a tracking system. Some can transmit a radio frequency, while others need 
scanning to be read. They are widely used most for geo-locating shipping orders but debates have arisen 
when they become mandatory for certain populations. See tudGe (2010), p. 89.
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from aggregating platforms or directly from carriers’ websites. Obviously, the 
point of departure is automatically filled because they suspect the airport you will 
be using, either from previous trips or because it’s the closest to your actual lo-
cation. Perhaps the prices are still a little too expensive and you create an e-alert 
to know when they will lower. You don’t even pay attention and end up signing 
to the website’s newsletter.
Five minutes later you check in on Facebook again to see what someone 
else is up to. And to leave some transient trace that will, somehow, be made 
permanent16 without your awareness. What will you get on the right-side col-
umn? The one with the advertising… The analysis of a person’s connections to 
other people, goods, and services permits software to make inferences about 
attitudes, taste, desires, and aspirations. As expected, what you get is “virtual 
nudging” about that trip you’re planning. Because someone knows you want to 
go somewhere, someday.
IT surveillance in the public discourse
Surveillance – to “watch over” from its original French – is a routine atten-
tion to specific features for influence and control17. It involves collecting data, 
processing it, and interpreting the results. Nowadays, usually big data18. IT sur-
veillance refers specifically to monitoring by means of electronic devices. In the 
arrangement of physical, physiological, and data surveillance19, technological 
monitoring would be an example of this last group. Surveillance does not de-
pend on technology, unlike Tudge (2010), p. 83, claims, but technological appa-
ratuses are more and more being used in monitoring routines and surveillance is 
increasingly becoming associated with technology. 
Technology is expanding and blurring the boundaries of surveillance. So, per-
haps an updated and useful distinction would also be between direct (targeted) 
16 One of the many “troubles” of social media surveillance, for tRottieR (2012), p. 7.
17 lyon (2007), p. 13. Elsewhere, lyon (2001), p. 56.
18 Big data is not only the clutching together of large quantities of information. lyon (2015), p. 69, ar-
gues that it’s also a way of managing data, as well as the twists and turns they may go through. How big 
databases are arranged, and how they are used and consulted, is different from smaller catalogues. The 
idea of big brother is associated with this novel manner of looking at data and metadata for the conclusions 
that can be drawn from the immense variety of links, even if only speculative, connecting the thousands of 
entries – it’s certainly a new trend in the configuration of power. Also, in general, ho, et al., (2017).
19 lloyd (2011), p. 4.
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surveillance20 and the “more general, all pervasive surveillance which permeates 
all our lives without being specifically directed at any particular purpose”21.
Different tools and agents are tasked with the several sections of the sur-
veillance process. The collection of data is the most visible facet of the chain of 
information – the scrutiny that makes citizens feel they’re losing privacy22. The 
other two typically remain “hidden” and abide by technical criteria that “secretly” 
conduct a form of social sorting. This can be of a general nature – the ran-
dom monitoring by just looking at individuals’ external traits – or follow precise 
guidelines. On the latter, Lloyd mentions the city council installation on London’s 
borough of Newham aiming specifically at matching passersby with databases 
of known offenders. Apparently, there is a rate of 75% accuracy, with some 
claiming this system to be sophisticated enough to overcome most attempts 
of facial and identity concealment. The next step in these CCTVs has been the 
programmed testing for behavioral patterns that might be found suspicious. 
The author alerts, however, for the devious side of such systems and the 
mindset behind them, well embedded in the “normalization” of spying23. It is 
very hard to measure or quantify how ITs affect individuals personally. Yet, the 
underlying problem is not exactly that one particular citizen was filmed but that 
everyone might be surveilled “indiscriminately and without a pre-established 
reason”24. The installation of technology must be proportionate, especially as 
it is freely accessible worldwide. Political activism has sometimes preferred ag-
gressive measures to make public, visible, statements in the fight against crime 
and terrorism.25 Times of insecurity often lead to the radicalization of preventive 
responses, trumping civil liberties under (stagy) public concerns. The system 
in Newham, for instance, relied on no less than 150 cameras, making a large 
percentage of innocent citizens suspect and systematically run against police 
databases26. 
20 lyon (2015), p. 70.
21 lloyd (2011), p. 5.
22 Literature on intelligence and privacy sees collection activities as a first “battling ground” for data pro-
tection discussions. For a specific analysis on the debate concerning counter-terrorism and surveillance in 
international law and human rights, see chesteRMan (2014), pp. 454 ff.
23 tudGe (2010), p. 15. The author illustrates the idea with “intitucionalized” shadow networks of espi-
onage, such as the North-American National Security Agency (NSA), which was only publicly known in 
the 70s, or the British MI5 and MI6, “unmentionables until the 1990s, with recruitment involving Oxbridge 
undergraduates being ‘sniffed at by wolves’”.
24 sloot (2017), p. 156.
25 Surveillance studies usually divide their research interests among the different “surveillance sites”, the 
political and social “areas of intervention” requiring monitoring mechanisms. See, lyon (2007), pp. 25 ff. 
Also, tRottieR (2012), pp. 17 ff.
26 lloyd (2011), p. 7.
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The processing of data no longer depends primarily on human agents in 
some cases27. Speed radars automatically process the information retrieved 
from the license plates of vehicles, verify it against police databases, and flag any 
violation of the area’s speed limit or the emergence of suspect cars. Neverthe-
less, (so far) there has always been the need for a human intermediary looking at 
the data, correcting anomalies, verifying the info and the automatic orders, and 
generally bridging the gaps in terms of profiling. The replacement of humans by 
fully-automated modules is also an issue on the surveillance debates, particularly 
those concerned with the accountability of the parties.
Surveillance is a pressing issue in every legal order, as well as in the interna-
tional sphere28. In the global fight against terrorism, IT surveillance has been an 
all-to-common “weapon” for political ideologies and actors to twist what we con-
sider to be “lawful interception”. This has been done by more and more means of 
formal and informal preemptive monitoring through the retention of bulk data29. 
Can we think of any contemporary city without surveillance? Nonetheless, this is 
not a new or exclusive phenomenon of modernity. It has happened since there 
was need to watch and control disruptive forces in the society. Surveillance has 
met different resistances but one thing is certain now: it’s a global condition. 
A condition sine qua non to inhabit cities30. A condition to engage in social affairs 
in the urban landscape. A condition to e-interact – something that is done more 
and more in urban settings with the development of societies31. So, the novelty 
aspect is that it’s no longer just a simple gathering of data for “positive” effects, 
like law enforcement to check on criminals or for permitting health services to 
find the best solutions for patients. Commonplace beliefs of surveillance asso-
ciate it with power and dominion32, with big data being extracted from citizens, 
retained in large catalogues, and processed through unknown information sys-
tems for the control and tracing of individuals by authorities or corporate bodies. 
Is this accurate?
Although the state has always been inclined to see privacy differently from 
people, the problem nowadays is that it finally has the tools to enforce its view. 
Moreover, surveillance is no longer concentrated but dispersed through numer-
ous locations from where data can be collected. And can often be accessed 
27 oGuRa (2006), p. 280.
28 For a study on data protection and informational privacy in international law, jurisprudence, and state 
practice (through a human rights-based comparative assessment) see, inter alia, RenGel (2013), pp. 145 ff.
29 iRion (2015), p. 80.
30 Fussey & coaFFee (2012), p. 201.
31 lyon (2001), p. 51.
32 nayaR (2015), p. 5.
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by multiple agencies33 as intelligence is scattered throughout records and data-
banks – from employment to medical histories, as well as in the form of users’ 
cards, check-ins, or Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Naturally, the entities col-
lecting and processing such information are multiple. Even if the state was the 
only harvester, the truth is that it gathers much more and diverse information 
than it did a couple of decades ago34.
An interesting dimension of how surveillance is undertaken is precisely the 
fractioning of the “self-surveilled”. There is no single “big brother” anymore. There 
is an assemblage of private and public, big, and perhaps not so big, brothers 
and sisters. The expansion of surveillance has led to the specialization of moni-
toring purposes. The individual can be monitored as a customer, worker35, con-
sumer, passenger, internet user, cash withdrawer, patient, etc36. Even some of 
these at the same time: imagine going to a shopping center. There are security 
guards and CCTV that see you as a visitor. The retail shops as a consumer. If you 
go to a travel agency, they will perceive you as a prospective passenger, as well 
as a consumer and cash payer. All in the same space but all linked to different 
centrals of command and processing systems. Getting the data from all these 
means of surveillance creates a diffuse puzzle made of fragments of a person’s 
whereabouts and undertakings. But the moment it is put together, the image 
created will have a high degree of accuracy, bringing circumstances, metadata37, 
and data into one (big) file extremely useful for tracing.
It might seem harder to trace someone’s steps this way but fragmentation 
means more information. The pieces can be put together and a chronology de-
pict an identity with far more precision. Law enforcement can prove or disprove 
an alibi in a much more detailed manner than without diffused surveillance. Yet, 
in times of legitimacy crisis, mass surveillance can easily slide to mass move-
ment control, for political reasons or other. In fact, surveillance by ITs is “the most 
versatile system from crime control to political management of the population, 
33 A reality worsened by conflicting competences between law enforcement agents and intelligence 
services in certain countries [chesteRMan (2014), pp. 458 ff.].
34 nayaR (2015), p. 6.
35 For a hypothetical model of an “omniscient organization”, see MaRx (2016), pp. 180 ff. The relations 
between employers and employees have provided important experimental evidence regarding the effects 
of systematic monitoring practices, which can have a profound negative impact in productivity rates. Drug 
testing, alongside technological lurking, is a good example, particularly in the US. Curiously, however, most 
corporations end up not gathering related statistical evidence to demonstrate the benefits of such regular 
testing on staff wellbeing, defeating the very purpose of such monitoring.
36 nayaR (2015), p. 7.
37 lyon (2015), pp. 73 ff.
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as CCTV on the streets as a technology of crime control is easily converted into 
surveillance of demonstrators on the street”38.
Surveillance is one side of our social relations39/40. CCTV links people and the 
relations stablished between watchers and watched are something of a trade. 
A trade in power. This apparently grim depiction of life cannot be underestimat-
ed. It can even come to affect democracy. Surveillance in public spaces shifts 
the balance of speech and the potential exercise of rights in numerous occa-
sions, like on parliaments. It can tilt the balance towards more accountability 
of people holding official duties but it can also curtail participation in the power 
processes41. Visibility is usually positive for the enforcement of legal and consti-
tutional principles, like transparency, certainty, and security. It reveals corruption, 
bringing light to opaque procedures. Exposure positively turns the public into the 
watcher of the state, but one should be cautious about phenomena like Wiki- 
Leaks, which might not altogether be beneficial for states’ affairs and diplomacy, 
even on behalf of the security and welfare of citizens.
The way surveillance is implemented is also relevant in the shaping of how 
we deal with technologies. “Draconian” surveillance, especially if introduced in 
a top-down approach, tends to meet higher resistance. This term can describe 
surveillance that surprises subjects because it was not expected or because it 
was introduced without their participation. On the other hand, it can also relate 
to a degree of intrusion. The workplace is a good sandbox. There are no work 
environments that can do without some form of monitoring. Technological sur-
veillance is becoming more and more the norm, with debates nowadays falling 
on e-mail monitoring and video cameras in “unusual” places, such as working 
spaces or even locker areas, not to mention toilets42.
Although monitoring is necessary to maintain order and productivity rates43, 
this kind of surveillance in public and private spaces can seriously unsettle in-
dividuals, which come to believe their superiors don’t trust them. And the fact 
is that even if there is a stable work environment, surveillance can become it-
self a disruptive force, breaking the bonds of trust under a layer of suspicion. 
38 oGuRa (2006), p. 289.
39 nayaR (2015), p. 3.
40 thelWall (2013), p. 68, asks relevant questions on the balance of social interactions on and offline 
such as “[d]o people expect more from a life partner met via the large databases of online dating agencies? 
Are distant relationships easier to maintain over time with Facebook? Do migrants retain closer connections 
with the birth country if they share family videos on YouTube?”.
41 nayaR (2015), p. 10.
42 MaRx (2016) p. 194.
43 Even as a general benefit by registering unlawful or devious behavior and making people accountable. 
It’s not uncommon the use of video records as evidence in cases of sexual harassment or theft, for exam-
ple.
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Excessive surveillance triggers precisely some of the behaviors it aimed to halt, 
like material and “time theft”, absenteeism, or production inefficiency. Also, it 
tends to overpower the feeling of the self 44. When the watched cannot watch 
the watchers, these become dangerously unregulated45. And those who do not 
know when and if they’re being monitored cannot point the finger at the watcher 
if he does something wrong himself – or if he is not paying careful attention46. 
Certain feelings tend to grow viz. excessive surveillance mechanisms47, like de-
moralization, disrespect, or anger. And the more draconian, i.e., the more intru-
sive and surprising, the more this sense of dehumanization will develop.
Nothing-to-hide
A common response to counter-balance privacy is the nothing-to-hide ar-
gument. Or slogan48. For the advocates of “borderless” truth, the complexity of 
modern life prevents enforcing the rule of law unless individuals are made “trans-
parent”. Stripping the individual of clothes, secrets, or possessions, and laying 
him in the “open” is, for them, the only way in which preemptive security can 
operate to a full efficiency degree. And if the person has nothing to hide, it won’t 
matter because her privacy will be restored as soon as possible. Or convenient.
Although barely reasonable from a human rights’ perspective, this need to 
put up with private and public meddling still strikes many as plausible. In fact, 
counter-terrorism strategies used to ignore human rights49 and data protection 
commitments. The main issue here, however, can be demonstrated by a simple 
44 Most services provided online demand personal information or are somehow linked to services and 
tools that feed them with users’ data. That’s why it can be an interesting exercise to go on “vanity search-
es”, i.e., to Google yourself, and perhaps your family and friends. This is the price of access to knowledge: 
to provide our own knowledge to others, even if we’re not a public figure – and there lies the root of the 
trade in power. This “dark side” is illustrated by the most-used research tool online: Google and Goog-
le-owned software register digitalized data and locate it online through our IP addresses or, in the case of 
dynamic IPs, through our browser details listed by websites’ cookies. See GuaRda (2009), pp. 250-251.
45 tudGe (2010), p. 86.
46 Plus, the possible scenario of bad, outdated, or broken systems that sometimes do not help identify-
ing the perpetrators at all.
47 MaRx (2016), p. 194, mentions an empirical research by sMith, et al., 1992, among others, that are 
quite revealing of the average greater stress and dissatisfaction levels felt by employees under monitoring 
when opposed to non-monitored workers.
48 In general, solove (2013).
49 Even at the UN level, only in 2005 was established the mandate of a Special Rapporteur on the 
promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism. This was 
pushed through by the Resolution of the Commission on Human Rights 2005/80, adopted on 21 April 
2005 (60th meeting), which later would lead to the UN’s Resolution of the General Assembly A/RES/60/288, 
adopted on 8 September 2006 (60th session). See scheinin (2013), p. 582.
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understanding of privacy as a core legal value. The right to privacy has a nega-
tive side, which, broadly, consists of keeping people outside of one’s personal 
business. For the full enjoyment of this right, all it takes is a quiet erga omnes 
daily experience of…being left alone. In fact, a fundamental right should never 
be perceived as a permanent defense that the individual must wield constantly 
to demonstrate being on the right side of the law.
Embedded in the very fabric of every legal system based on sound princi-
ples is the straightforward presumption of innocence. Any democracy would 
be perverted if the citizen had to demonstrate his innocence and not the ac-
cusers his wrongdoing. To ask for considerable exposure under the idea that, 
otherwise, he or she has something to hide, makes suspicion preclude privacy. 
Saying that people will only be innocent if they have nothing to hide shifts the 
focus of law and principle from one’s inherent human rights to mechanical and 
malicious suspicion, to an ever-present doubt that displaces the human being 
from the center of the legal system. In the end, this would most likely turn into a 
carte blanche to (more) aggressive governmental surveillance. To inconceivable 
control. To less-than-democratic oppression. 
This reasoning is preoccupying not only in the public space. In the work-
place, paranoid employers would be tempted to find “disloyalties” from their 
staff, preemptively jeopardizing privacy by abusively intruding into people’s lives. 
And the “meme ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ might then be applied to them, 
leaving them suspected of anything from a drug habit to an affair”50 – which are 
outside-of-the-job behaviors that should not be used to endanger the work po-
sition of any employee, except in very specific circumstances. In fact, workplace 
surveillance is big business but not necessarily also good for business51. If this 
is yet not convincing enough, picture yourself getting arrested on the street52 
or doing some less-than-social behavior like peeing outside. Now, picture this 
while getting caught on a 360.º panoramic Google Street View update. Have you 
nothing to hide then? 
Data and metadata can be equally menacing in the context of this nothing-
to-hide idea. Most times, both types generated by individual and corporate use 
– just like the historic I am leaving behind of bibliographic references available 
online to assemble this piece of writing – are “inconsequential, even beneficial”. 
But if they are freely accessible in the hands of security agencies, there’s not only 
50 tudGe (2010), p. 19.
51 Differently, idem, pp. 107 ff.
52 stylianou (2011), p. 51. Although the author then considers that the technological effect on monitoring 
might render itself “practically innocuous” because, outside these clear violations of privacy which would 
strongly hold up in court, most individual information collected is just “lost in translation” among the numer-
ous frames caught with other people’s data.
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the downside of having an undesirable someone snooping around our personal 
stuff. There’s also the possibility that the kind of associations they make are 
wrong or false. They are not immune to misidentification, corruption, or fraud. 
As Lyon puts it, connecting fragments of unconnected data is often “based on 
stereotypical assumptions about people from particular backgrounds [and] may 
create apparently incriminating profiles that are readily seized upon by those 
taught to think that citizens-in-general may be masquerading as terrorists. Peo-
ple with no criminal record, who have done no wrong and have nothing to hide 
may yet have much to fear”53.
Besides qualitatively violating several fundamental rights, the argument fails 
to convince also for a sort of quantitative defect: its multiplication requirement. 
The number of times one could hypothetically end up having to prove his “inno-
cence”, i.e., that he had nothing bad, legally wrong, to hide from public view or 
law enforcement, makes the argument quite harmful in practice.
Every time an individual faces any monitoring apparatus, he must display 
part of his identity, of himself, to others. Based on the argument, one could go as 
far as to say that, provided he has nothing embarrassing to tell the authorities (or 
private companies!), then he should submit and be scrutinized repeatedly, every 
time they pleased, with no right to keep his affairs secret or private. Otherwise, 
he could immediately be suspect of trying to hide something criminal, even if – 
and there would be no room for contradictory, in a very much kafkian logic – he 
was only attempting to conceal his own assemblage of the self from prying eyes. 
Truly, agreeing with the argument could lead to a “slippery slope” of allowing for 
the multiplication54 of monitoring systems with a wider and denser capacity of 
surveillance and barely any limits. What counter-argument could then be used to 
deter monitoring? If law-abiding citizens have nothing to hide, they won’t mind 
intrusion and so there are no restrictions, namely of checks and balances, to 
surveillance. 
One could argue that this is nothing short to hypothetical. That this robust 
surveillance attitude doesn’t happen in democracy and that arguing based on 
abstract ever-present monitoring systems is absurd. Democracies have, none-
theless, been smothered for less.
53 lyon (2015), pp. 75-76.
54 “Institutionalization” of data use multiplies the effects of gathering information, especially when there’s 
an almost “professionalization” of the searching and collecting methods. See Rule (2007), p. 195.
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In the private sector we trust
The state is no longer the sole owner of surveillance mechanisms. It has 
dominion only over regulations on the use and licensing. Although governments 
are becoming more aware of their citizens’ personal data, the private sector is 
now the dominant force in collection. Public services rely on identification, CCTV, 
and specific info contained in health or financial records and they produce an 
important bulk of material on citizens. But private companies usually access, re-
tain, and process much more, with modern computing permitting the circulation 
of data at a massive level55.
Consumers are usually willing to give far more information online than on 
physical formats. Some businesses approach their customers by asking for 
data optionally and even provide cards for future purchases. Most, however, 
either create a commercial profile on their systems or prefer the client to follow 
a specific link to their websites to register there. Individuals enroll to access the 
benefits the company seems to “altruistically” provide them56. The amount of 
personal data quickly becomes nothing more than a stone in the shoe of having 
a profile and thus enjoying the new “personal relation” with the company. Like it 
was a sort of status that made that client special, different. And, in the end, who 
will suspect of the mailshotted questionnaire with a chance to win an appealing 
prize provided you freely disclose all manner of personal data?
Public services, on the other hand, seldom relinquish a physical act that gives 
a degree of solemnity, public certainty, and legal bond to the interaction between 
the citizen and the administration. It enables the latter to know who is the former, 
or his legal representative, and better guarantees that someone is not pretend-
ing to be someone else while interacting with the executive. In fact, an important 
difference between digital and physical interactions, transposable to the private 
vs public relations, derives from the distinction between privacy57 and anonymity. 
Unlike individuals feel, the private sector seldom cares about exactly who sits on 
the terminal end of their network or joins their freely-accessible loyalty services. 
While e-government rests on information about an individual because of who he 
is, the anonymity of commercial requests is less to do “about the person per se, 
55 anGWin (2014), p. 30.
56 As stylianou (2011), p. 51, argues, “privacy is likely overestimated, often because we fail to put the 
loss of privacy in perspective thereby exaggerating the potential – but rarely realizable – dangers, and that 
even when the dangers are real, people are often willing to compromise their privacy for the benefits a given 
technology has to offer”.
57 The different definitions and debates around the concept of privacy will not be discussed here. For the 
purposes of this text, it was adopted the notion of “informational privacy”, i.e., the extent to which someone 
can control the disclosure of his personal data. It involves the right to be free from prying eyes and the actual 
control over the intelligence once it reaches third parties, according to lloyd (2011), p. 11.
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but their behavioural patterns…for wider profiling purposes”58. Private entities 
set commercial reports to profit from numbers. They look at personality traces 
in an economics perspective, not a political one. Their “interest” is not aiming at 
either friendliness or ensuring citizens pay their debts. It’s purposely-driven in a 
blank and massive way that leads to consumption of their products.
Surveillance defines aspects of the interactions between people; also be-
tween the state and its citizens. Nayar says that “surveillance is a form of gov-
ernance not only by the state but by non-state actors as well”59. The problem, 
nonetheless, is that we trust (more) private actors because we usually don’t 
feel their governing pressure. And also because we imagine the readers of our 
uploaded contents to be as distant as the internet itself, often leading us to 
forget basic rules of behavior and that an “offline comeback” might be a serious 
impending threat60.
Unlike when it comes to public surveillance, a common user won’t fully re-
alize or mind most private apparatuses. Knowing the surfing whereabouts, the 
number of clicks, the time spent on webpages, or with the mouse pointer over 
certain contents is somehow different from being monitored by police cameras 
on poles. Nevertheless, the personal consequences can be just as serious. In-
surance companies can snoop around for undisclosed details of personal life, 
universities and corporations can verify the background and current activities of 
staff and students, and private secret services’ job are made much easier as they 
can outline a profile with just a few clicks. On the other hand, while some online 
tools permit users to delete or edit information provided, thus making them have 
a certain degree of control, others are quite reticent to do it. Google, for instance, 
has been under the spotlight for hanging on to (too much) information61. Al-
though sometimes the record left behind linking IP addresses and searched key-
words can have positive outcomes62, having a permanent history of your online 
activities in the hands of usually unaccountable private corporations should have 
a “chilling effect”, even if you are not planning to do anything unlawful. 
Citizens should realize that everyday monitoring by private parties means 
that ordinary people – not secret services or accountable public officials; or, at 
least, not only – are checking, gathering, processing, and storing their personal 
data with barely any limits. Adding this to privacy options that can make your 
e-mail contents searchable for meaningful advertising and your cell phone a 
58 Idem, p. 6.
59 nayaR (2015), p. 3.
60 tudGe (2010), p. 16.
61 Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruling C131/12, Google Spain and Google, 13 May 
2014.
62 See the criminal case illustrated in tudGe (2010), p. 18.
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permanent GPS tracker63, makes trusting the private sector something like mice 
trusting cats. Not to speak of the fact that almost any website is susceptible of 
hacking64.
When it comes to online contracts, for instance, the fact that they are 
“shielded” by legal guarantees, even if we don’t read them, gives the appear-
ance of safety and security concerning our data and how it will be handled. But 
the fact remains that private monitoring can be just as systematic and intrusive 
as public monitoring. The thickening of data retrieved by corporations can re-
flect legal demands that allow and “encourage” for the piling of clients’ personal 
information. For instance, years ago telephone companies used to collect only 
basic metadata – things like the duration of calls, when they took place, and the 
location of the connecting devices. Nowadays, phone invoices detail everything 
about our conversations, except the content. Businesses are required to supply 
all this intelligence so that clients know what exactly they’re paying for and can 
control their usage figures65. This way, companies are not only encouraged but 
obliged to have enormous databases and often their contracts with third-parties 
(sub-contractors) to manage the data severely jeopardize privacy. As Lord Hoff-
mann put it, “the right to keep oneself to oneself, to tell other people that certain 
things are none of their business, is under technological threat”66.
Acceptance towards self-surveillance (through exposing our personal lives 
on social networks) and informal surveillance, i.e., by creating commercial pro-
files, add up to state surveillance in the filling of the gaps of information. It’s 
important to keep in mind that a good deal of the intelligence states gather 
comes from private agents in the marketplace, usually from purchasing goods 
and asking for an invoice. We know there is an “invisible chain” connecting pri-
vate networks and public databases but we don’t link any of them to the idea of 
surveillance, thus trusting the non-state sector when it obviously depends, relies, 
and passes information to governments. And while most people worry about 
their information ending up in public records, they forget that most private CCTV 
operators are not properly scrutinized, for instance, to comply with the right of 
access to the data67.
The phenomenon of decentralization of surveillance through public and pri-
vate forms of observation68 can lead to a culture of suspicion but also to a culture 
63 tudGe (2010), p. 18.
64 Idem, p. 17, gives the example of the 2005 hacking of Facebook where two students of the Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology downloaded data from 70,000 profiles for a research project.
65 lloyd (2011), p. 8.
66 Idem, p. 9.
67 BeRG (2015).
68 nayaR (2015), p. 4.
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of “neighborhood knowledge”. Although physical surveillance is as old as soci-
ety itself69, we want to know more and more about what other people do, say, 
think, and even eat – specially those closest to us, the neighbor behind the lace 
curtains. Talk shows, soap operas, and human interest stories are apparently 
innocent examples of how individuals know about others, either real or fictitious. 
But this “convergence” generates blurred surveillance, mixing different aims and 
roles, actors, and processes70.
One could then ask whether new technologies creeping on most aspects of 
modern life can damage the quality of our consent to this way of things. Con-
sent here will be used in a broad fashion, ranging from the general consent to 
be part of the social contract to more limited ways, such as acceptance, implicit 
or express, to engage in legal contracts online. The traditional idea of consent to 
contract rests on the assumption that the interested parties know the full scope 
of the bonds – they are not only aware of the new legal norms befalling on their 
particular relations but they usually are part of the process of drafting such rules, 
which gives a degree of commitment to the contract per se and, specifically, to 
how they shall enforce it. And even if they haven’t been part in the making, they 
must, at least, have all the necessary data to accept and comply with the rules 
that apply. This happens in obviously different ways, as alluded, if one’s talking 
about formal contracts or in the context of the so-called social contract.
By trusting the need to be surveilled and accepting monitoring from differ-
ent entities through contracting, we pile up “moments of consent” that end up 
making us agree, i.e., consent, to be surveilled in almost all moments of our 
digital lives. In the end, they come to change the social contract – that invisible 
agreement that makes us irresistibly part of the political society – by adding extra 
layers of “tiny” self-surveillance here and there.
Are we consenting to be surveilled?
Some literature sees surveillance as a mechanism for social sorting71 but 
I agree with Nayar when he considers it to be more of a “phenomenological 
element that informs, influences and inflects even our interiority”72. Surveillance 
is not necessarily a bad thing per se73 and it appears to be embedded in our 
citizenship, like part of the ever-present and ever-renewed social contract of 
69 lloyd (2011), p. 15.
70 nayaR (2015), p. 4.
71 For example, Goos, et al. (2015), pp. 51 ff.
72 nayaR (2015), p. 2.
73 anGWin (2014), p. 37.
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modern times. In an unsettling perspective, we could redo René Descartes’ 
most known quote to “I am surveilled therefore I am”74.
Users’ consent75 is at the core of attempts from the judiciary76 to shield pri-
vacy and keep high standards of data protection regarding personal information. 
Like most social interactions in life, accessing virtual communities or agreeing 
to contracting online depends on consent. But in the e-space, the quality of 
consent can be tainted. We are witnessing that more and more individuals are 
not aware that their personal information is being collected or, at least, how it will 
be used77. This way, they have no opportunity to consent or withhold consent 
in a meaningful and timely manner. Consent is thus a key principle of any data 
protection regulation but how to “solidify” that consent has been a debatable 
matter, specially viz. the global dissemination of data by online tools that no data 
subject can ever fully grasp, let alone control78.
The “massification” of contractual operations (joining a social network, ship-
ping orders, etc.), particularly undertaken by younger generations, can begin to 
explain how little time we devote to read online (legal) documents. Hardly anyone 
truly weights the pros and cons of ticking the box as that would amount to read-
ing 20 or more pages of tiny lettering with a profusion of obscure legal terms. 
Why bother when you can just scroll down or skip ahead and click on the box 
next to the “I understand the terms and conditions” phrase? Is not like anyone 
reads it. And it’s not like anyone is watching over your shoulder and making a 
disapproving nod at you. Right?
74 nayaR (2015), p. 2.
75 A trace of the principle of collection in data privacy regulations. See, inter alia, Article 7 of the Organi-
zation for Economic Co-operation and Development Guidelines on the protection of privacy and transbor-
der flows of personal data, Doc. C(80)58/FINAL, adopted on 23 September 1980, which reads that “[t]here 
should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair 
means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject”. Also, GReenleaF (2013), 
p. 237.
76 For instance, in the judgments on the merits delivered by the Grand Chamber of the European Court 
of Human Rights Bǎrbulescu vs Romania, no. 61496/08, 5 September 2017, Satakunnan Markkinapörssi 
Oy and Satamedia Oy vs Finland, no. 931/13, 27 June 2017, Roman Zakharov vs Russia, no. 47143/06, 
4 December 2015; the case law of the CJEU C-73/16, Peter Puškár vs Finančné riaditeľstvo Sloven-
skej republiky and Kriminálny úrad finančnej správy, 27 September 2017, C-203/15 and C-698/15, Tele2 
Sverige AB vs Post- och telestyrelsen and Secretary of State for the Home Department vs Tom Watson 
and Others, 21 December 2016, C-582/14, Patrick Breyer vs Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 19 October 
2016, C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems vs Data Protection Commissioner, 6 October 2015, C-293/12 and 
C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland Ltd vs Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and 
Others and Kärntner Landesregierung and Others, 8 April 2014, C-524/09, Ville de Lyon vs Caisse des 
dépôts et consignations, 22 December 2010; or the ruling of the General Court of the European Union 
T-343/13, CN vs European Parliament, 3 December 2015.
77 See the balance between benefits and harms in edWaRds (2013), pp. 315 ff.
78 tudGe (2010), p. 15.
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The smooth way in which one can skip ahead of reading the details of e-con-
tracts should be worrying in terms of their legal validity, in terms of the consent 
given and the strength of acceptance of all the terms, perks, downsides, and 
conditions of engaging into contracts in the virtual milieu. Some websites make 
sure that, at least, the contract is viewed in full by blocking the following steps 
until the user has reached the bottommost line. But does this suffice? These are 
scenarios where the pressure of signature, that is, of having a pack of pages 
with a contract in one’s hands and having to sign it in the end (and perhaps also 
rubricating each of the previous pages), is, for all its worth, absent.
Let’s take a small step back and breathe in. Surveillance is not necessarily 
opposed to any sentiment of privacy. They are flexible concepts and, just like 
most legal interests and rights, they have ambiguous borders. In some respects, 
it could be said that the degree of privacy is still maintained when the personal 
data provided is accessible only to a select group of people with proper access 
codes. There are policies that entities can implement to restrict the viewers of 
databases, like those based on hierarchy. The concern deepens, however, when 
individuals are driven to hand out information on a regular basis and there are 
little or no guarantees of who will handle it. They can ask for privacy on a gen-
eral basis but, from an external onlooker, it would seem most people do “little 
to protect themselves”79. Thousands of individuals join communities that share 
intelligence every day, not to mention what goes on at the retail level. As Tudge 
put it, hyper-exhibitionism online has just taken a step further, from glamour to 
the banal80. And for marketing purposes, it’s very hard to make sure there is 
only a few people with access rights that read the data. A customer’s file can 
go back and forth between the several departments of a corporation, be copied 
multiple times, processed in several computers, and analyzed by many different 
white collars. And we are not talking about secret services or top-level state de-
partments. We’re talking about normal, private, businesses with normal, private, 
human resources policies.
There is not yet a new balance, both in the mindsets as well as in legal writ-
ing, in terms of new meanings for data protection, privacy, secrecy, or consent 
in current times. The US are more “advanced” in terms of surveillance schemes, 
governmental or corporate, while Europe still struggles – perhaps positively – 
with keeping the core of human and fundamental rights safe from prying eyes. 
But in both sides of the Atlantic, in an almost anecdotal way, peeping through 
the keyhole of a bathroom is instinctively perceived as a privacy violation, while 
being under the radar of inter-connected surveillance mechanisms in a mall or 
79 lloyd (2011), p. 11.
80 tudGe (2010), p. 15.
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an airport, ranging from CCTV to biometrics, is…well, not. Airport facilities are, in 
fact, the “epitome of surveillance-oriented” societies81, denying the anonymity of 
passengers while increasing the identification of travelers in a quasi-direct pro-
portion from the entrance to the boarding gate. They, sometimes literately, strip 
you down82. There operate several entities with different agendas and monitoring 
devices, from the private sector to governmental immigration bureaus, in a sort 
of “ecosystem of integrated surveillance”. As Ogura argues, technology permits 
surveillance of the individual to go well beyond the confined space of the airport 
as the processing of data in the electronic microchips of passports and of visual 
and sound material from CTTV and cooperative mechanisms is usually not done 
exclusively through data systems located inside its physical space. Data can 
even travel somewhere outside the host country with little technical restriction. 
In such an “oppressive” context, it seems “we have no other choice but to sac-
rifice our privacy rights”83 – which renders any notion of individual consent from 
the surveilled parties irrelevant. And we’re not even talking about online users in 
these examples.
Irion makes an interesting argument when stating that a handicap in finding 
this new balance is that constitutional and legal checks and balances to counter 
unlimited surveillance have developed in the framework of targeted surveillance. 
Safeguards that are thus appropriate to direct and limited monitoring performed 
with strict oversight and usually in the context of criminal investigations are natu-
rally insufficient to refrain mass surveillance. However, there has been no signifi-
cant legal adjustment in many countries to create or update (or upgrade, truth be 
told) such arrangements to mass surveillance. And the fact is that “preemptive 
and systemic surveillance exceeds qualitatively and quantitatively the situation of 
targeted surveillance”84 by far.
A U-turn where strong and traditional privacy and data protection concerns 
prevent the flow of data between legal orders and deter private and public ac-
cess to citizens’ personal information does not seem a likely scenario. Com-
merce depends on trade, namely trade of information of the people involved in 
the transactions. It’s a form of building trust. A form of getting to know the other 
side, especially viz. the fact that most companies display their institutional and 
organizational features to the public on their webpages but don’t know much 
about the buyers of their products when they first come to shop. But it’s argua-
bly a form of using knowledge to make profit.
81 oGuRa (2006), p. 281.
82 See the case studies on airport and CCTV present in neyland (2009), pp. 30 ff.
83 oGuRa (2006), p. 281.
84 iRion (2015), p. 82.
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Surveillance is bound to evolve with the concept of society in Western de-
mocracies. Nayar is sharp when instigating us to “start thinking about surveillance 
not simply as technological mechanisms of control…but as a cultural phenome-
non”85. However, the development of this “phenomenon” should be halted when 
“distrust becomes normalized, repackaged and marketed as a proper (and prof-
itable) state of mind”86. CCTV, above all, empowers the hierarchical division of 
power in the system of those who watch and those who are watched and its fast 
development is now capable of turning an anonymous face, a John Doe, into a 
concrete individual in a matter of hours, or much less. From facial recognition to 
tax revenues, the interoperability of databases enables watchers with a sufficient 
access level to quickly grasp indexes of personal and sensitive data faster than 
ever before. What does this imply in terms of the “anonymous public”? What 
does it do the idea of preserving one’s personal data, other than our own face, 
among the throngs of fellow by passers? Also, it’s interesting to dwell on the 
possibility of local communities accepting or rejecting these intruders – is there 
such an option at all?
Although many consider surveillance to enable a better, safer, society, most 
people are powerless to say whether they would prefer to be surveilled or not. 
This becomes a serious concern when most surveillance dragnets go beyond 
our previous notions of traditional surveillance, being “suspicionless, comput-
erized, impersonal, and vast in scope”87. They create a sort of “shadow sur-
veillance”, which could potentially turn modern, even robust, democracies into 
police states. There is a real concern that a slippery slope may appear when 
these powerful data gathering and mining tools are used for increasingly pettier 
needs until societies are smothered under a “veil” of constant surveillance and 
are thus unable to (re)organize themselves without surveillance gears.
For Nayar, a line can be drawn between those who are surveilled regardless 
of their will (like commuters on public transportation) and those who opt to be 
surveilled by adhering to self-surveilling mechanisms, such as social networks. 
As the author says, a line between compulsory and voluntary sharing of data, 
which apparently leads to a stark difference in terms of ontological data sub-
jects88. But is it that simple?
85 nayaR (2015), p. 5.
86 tudGe (2010), p. 159.
87 anGWin (2014), p. 37.
88 nayaR (2015), p. 31.
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The problem of consent89 has many nuances and it might not be entirely 
accurate simply to say that people can choose not to have an account on a 
social network or that they could refuse adhere to loyalty cards. Even setting 
aside the leakage effect, i.e., the passing of data to third-parties (the core of 
cookies’ debates) – and which are often outside the knowledge and control of 
the data subject –, the fact is that these so-called voluntary transfers of personal 
data may not be that voluntary, in a way. In some less-surveilled cities, where 
surveillance isn’t almost impossible to avoid, one could say that the individual 
could diminish his exposure by taking some “precautions”, like driving a personal 
vehicle instead of taking a public transport, avoiding areas where he knows there 
is a CCTV system installed, and so on. This way, compulsory surveillance would 
look like voluntary surveillance, in some situations, and the individual would be 
shielded against certain prying eyes. However, wouldn’t this end up by being an 
erratic behavior, defeating basic common sense or any sustainable way of living? 
It would make the life of the individual far more complicated, impossible perhaps 
in the long run, not least for economic reasons. 
In a similar fashion, avoiding the perks of loyalty cards, frequent flyer miles, 
or, in less obvious manners, having an account on Facebook90, could lower the 
quality of life of individuals. These are advantages of modern life that come with 
a price. Advantages that most people can live without – at least some people, 
for now – but that are becoming normal, everyday, stuff and rapidly looking less 
and less like advantages or whims. This “voluntary consent” to be surveilled in 
such cases might not be so voluntary after all because the services and goods 
provided are more and more part of what it means to live in the present times. 
And this is why even those fully aware of the potential monitoring shadow of 
certain (online) activities and of the consequent social control, seldom modify 
their behavior. Those services are embedded into the fabric of our current social 
existence, transforming themselves, sooner or later, into compulsory facilities. 
In fact, “as well as being a commodity in its own right, data is the motor 
and fuel which drives the information society”91. Already having a loyalty card 
in a supermarket that offers discounts in future purchases hardly seems an ad-
vantage most people can (easily) live without. What about travelling? For some 
people, it’s a necessity. For others, a commodity. It’s a borderline scenario where 
voluntary and mandatory consent are quite hard to untangle – and one should 
89 Unlike argued by Rule (2007), p. 170, people often choose and thus consent to provide personal data 
and have their privacy violated, in several different ways. The nuances of the concept focus precisely on the 
type of consent for each type of data collection. People have been relinquishing – and the issue lies at the 
heart of their knowledge to consent – to secrecy of their data to get something in return, which depends on 
the context, from the direct scale of user-social network to the indirect of public-CCTV, for instance. 
90 All examples present in nayaR (2015), p. 31.
91 lloyd (2011), p. 15.
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not only consider “surveillance-overloaded” airports as there are CCTV and oth-
er forms of surveillance in most bus and train stations. And what about when 
consent is virtually inexistent, like when a satellite photographs you to update an 
online map? Are you tacitly consenting when you’re…walking outside?
Removing those “perks” is certainly not that easy or straightforward for most 
people and in most sectors of economic activity. New economic sectors beyond 
the traditional three-party division depend heavily on modern technologies. If 
the tertiary sector, composed of service-based activities, already relies on some 
surveillance-based equipment (computers above all), the quaternary and the 
quinary exist because there are supporting technologies. The former consists on 
knowledge-based activities and the latter on intellectually-based activities at a 
macro level. The quaternary is concerned with the “non-physical” organization of 
the society, comprising government, research, cultural programs, IT itself – like 
services providing information, such as computing, ICT, or consultancy –, and 
education. The fifth level is similar to this one but only bridges top (senior) man-
agement levels. Both are developments of the tertiary group that have sprung 
from the computerizing of society and the inherent exchange of data that keeps 
it running.
Modern society, particularly in Western countries, comes indeed with a sur-
veillance “price tag”. It’s like a parasite latching onto modern technologies and 
growing fatter as they themselves expand. If you think about it, computers didn’t 
have cameras in their beginnings in the 1960s. Nonetheless, today they are one 
of the prime tools for checking on an individual. Research, development, and 
widespread use have followed the path of information sharing because that’s 
the funny logic of using technologies – to enable us to get in contact with each 
other, not physically but through a parallel world. It’s only natural that we feel 
slightly bothered by having someone snooping over our shoulder 24/7. But, in 
the end of the day, we are the ones who have invited him, aren’t we? As mod-
ern societies are computerized societies, the technological advances that make 
our lives easier should not be perceived as something to be purged – it’s even 
hard to picture a 21st century day with no technology apart from some small 
communities that have somehow resisted the passing of time in remote areas of 
the world. And we can instantly detect how living without it would make us feel 
uncomfortable, to say the least. Technological leaps are advantages and they 
are necessary and an integrated part of our idea of society, of living together in 
a community.
So, the difference between the “genuinely disempowered and placed under 
surveillance and those who opt”92 is a more complex issue than meets the eye. 
92 nayaR (2015), p. 31.
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The internet supports most of the daily activities of steadfastly increasing frac-
tions of the global population93. In fact, technological communications permeate 
literally every aspect of modern, contemporary, life because they satisfy “hu-
man’s need to socialize and connect with others”94. And online activities also 
affect offline behaviors95. Deep down, our consent derives from the safety and 
sense of protection that monitoring provides – from the legislator down to your 
regular by passer. And anything that makes us feel secure, that broadly advertis-
es serving to catch the “bad guys”, is usually seen as a good thing. The more we 
believe CCTV should be used to monitor our movements and thus deter crime96, 
the more surveillance will be embedded in our social selves. We surveil and are 
surveilled – after all, it’s for everyone’s benefit. But we share information with cor-
porations not because there is a monitoring system in place. We do not answer 
questionnaires because we really want someone to know what we bought and 
when. We consent to those “little” trade-offs of having our personal information 
depart our private sphere because we have come to believe it’s all needed, that 
it should be like that, perhaps even for some sort of greater good. Nevertheless, 
sometimes this preventive surveillance97 is based on little evidence that the bal-
ance of interests at play is adequate, necessary, and proportional.
Public ignorance regarding the full scope of surveillance98 (and to whether 
there is someone actually sitting on the other side of the prying eye) or simply our 
willingness to obey the rules can lead to the curious effect of public acceptance, 
consent, provoking good inner feelings. When we grow aware of our consent 
to surveil and be surveilled (like “accepting” to go through biometric identifica-
tion), and we start playing along with the system, we often let our vulnerability 
be transformed into compliance, tolerance, and adaptation. And then we feel 
law-abiding citizens, accepting surveillance and our “duties” under someone 
else’s gaze. We let ourselves be engulfed by the culture of surveillance and then 
93 thelWall (2013), p. 69.
94 iRion (2015), p. 79.
95 thelWall (2013), p. 70. Also, in general, naRdi (2010).
96 Usually based on the fallacious idea of the “rational offender”. For noRRis (2012), p. 256, this consists 
on the assumption that non-offenders, are “aware of the presence of the cameras…Second…that, even if 
the offender is aware of the cameras, [he has] factored them in to a rational calculation…Third…that, while 
the rational offender is deterred, the same offender appears not rational enough merely to commit the crime 
in a different place, or choose to commit a different type of crime less susceptible to camera surveillance. 
Finally, it assumes that, if the offender is aware of the cameras, [he] will be deterred…[Nonetheless, re-
search] with street robbers, burglars, shop thieves and card fraudsters has revealed that few indicated that 
the presence of cameras made any difference as to whether they would commit a crime or not”. Is it then 
that only the law-abiding fear CCTV?
97 nayaR (2015), p. 7.
98 tudGe (2010), p. 85.
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there is little more than “fashion ourselves as surveilled citizens…performing in 
particular ways in front of the camera”99.
The presence of surveillance mechanisms tends to modify our way of inter-
acting. It can produce no visible effects on human behavior but it usually does. 
At least, from the moment the surveilled realize they’re being surveilled. As Nayar 
argues, IT changes not only how we interact among ourselves but the perma-
nence of a surveillance gear in a place, specially indoors100, changes how we 
come to deal with it, not the least on the long run. Even if we do not become ex-
emplar citizens like suggested above, we get accustomed to do things in a way, 
perhaps even turning us into a better version of ourselves under that familiar 
gaze to which we might get used to. In fact, it’s very hard to effectively reject sur-
veillance once the public as a body accepts to be under the technical prying eye.
Surveillance is needed, particularly in times of insecurity. That should not be 
realistically denied. But too much surveillance can lead to too much suspicion 
and boost bad sentiments towards living in community. It can trigger emotions 
and anxiety that lead people to become less rational in their social interactions. 
The “culture of insecurity”, especially when it is exacerbated before the real 
threats and dangers of the modern world, makes vulnerable subjects out of us-
ers, nationals, neighbors, and friends. And then surveillance is used as a token 
for freedom – the common-place of a “small” price to pay against insecurity, 
vulnerability101, and fear.
The main consequential problem with this culture is its multiplying effect. 
A culture of surveillance tends to generate “culturally-surveilled” subjects, that 
is, people who don’t strive or see the need to question the surveillance mecha-
nisms – silent consenters. Some simply won’t care and others will actively insti-
gate it. All perpetuate this culture, the latter perhaps even taking a step further 
in the subtle oppression. Not only a top-down oppression but a worst kind: an 
oppression from all sides. Even from within, from ourselves, the data subjects. 
This way, cameras will remain in their poles and, sooner or later, more will join 
them. Perhaps cameras won’t even be our major concern but instead our own 
attitude towards surveillance and towards others.
Given this scenario, it could be argued that surveillance becomes a “cultur-
ally accepted and culturally legible process”102. In the end, a culture of insecurity 
leads to a culture of surveillance, or surveillance-oriented103. And so forth: we 
99 nayaR (2015), p. 33.
100 For a comparison between different surveillance tests, both in and outside buildings, see anGWin 
(2014), pp. 45-46.
101 nayaR (2015), p. 5.
102 Idem, p. 6.
103 oGuRa (2006), p. 280.
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truly become surveilled citizens104. Plus, we want to belong to the many offers 
of society, to adhere to consumption models, to be part of travelling plans. And 
there is nothing wrong about the plentiful offers modern society has to provide, 
so long as they can be understood and apprehended rationally. As this culture 
of belonging105 comes with precautionary, often preemptive, surveillance, we, as 
individuals and as citizens, should be aware of becoming surveilled (political) an-
imals by our own consent. A consent that can either have thin legal grounds and 
be recklessly exercised or that can be refrained, tamed, educated, and nurtured. 
It’s not necessarily the “fault” of others the immense surveillance we are embed-
ded in – consent and accountability should be the base for “harvesting personal 
information”, translated into purpose limitation, non-disclosure policies, and a 
controlled retention rationale106. A healthy, informed, consent and a surveillance 
attitude balanced by reasonable security and privacy concerns (which are both 
democratic interests)107 are only possible with a shared commitment by all rele-
vant parties – citizens, governments, corporations, and (especially) security and 
intelligence agencies108 – of checking and balancing each other.
Technologies have evolved to permit surveillance from a distance and to per-
mit the collection of material without the presence of the person, especially when 
information systems are interoperable, i.e., able to communicate in a quick and 
effective way without loss or damage of data. A consented surveillance culture 
104 Particularly seen as groups and less as random individuals. It’s interesting the idea of change in the 
ratione personae paradigm with the new technologies of mass surveillance in sloot (2017), p. 75.
105 nayaR (2015), p. 8.
106 lyon (2001), p. 129.
107 lyon (2015), pp. 98 ff. Although questioning the consistency of mass surveillance and democracy fur-
ther in pp. 107 ff. The author also stresses that not many really see mass surveillance as a peril to democ-
racy, facing its growth “more as necessary than negative”. As long as there are thousands of bureaucrats 
and systems’ analysts sitting in desks at computer terminals managing someone else’s data and metadata, 
there might be a risk of a sort of “corporate Holocaust”, an updated and perhaps much more terrifying 
version of Hannah Arendt’s banality of evil. And it’s true that security can trump politics when fear settles in. 
Nonetheless, as he comes to recognize as well, “in some respects democracy depends on surveillance”.
108 Data collectors must change their “default position” (in a social-organisational sense, not a technical 
one) from deciding to collect to trying not to collect information, in the words of BRoWn & koRFF (2010), 
p. 12. Both governmental and private policies should pay lip service to the principle of no surveillance 
“without meaningful individual consent or legislative authorization” [Rule (2007), pp. 195-196]. As the au-
thor continues, “taking privacy seriously…would amount to a revolutionary overthrow of practices now 
prevailing in the United States, and to a lesser degree elsewhere [and] entail that any commercialization of 
personal data, either from government files or private-sector records, would require active assent from the 
individual concerned. In the jargon of privacy-watchers, ‘opt in’ would be the rule”. And perhaps this can be 
taken beyond commerce. In fact, the author’s definition of commerce – “activities aimed at creating value 
for institutional decision making on the people concerned” – seems to accommodate areas where there 
is no actual commercialization but where, nonetheless, personal data is used in other meaningful ways, 
such as state surveillance. Although an important shift in action but also in mentality, this “individual veto 
power” is crucial to the sustainable development of surveillance practices and to raise awareness to the full 
implications of consent. See also, GReenleaF (2013), p. 247.
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appears to be one of the prices of cosmopolitanism, of globalization. However, 
just like any (social) phenomenon, it should develop in a sustainable way. This 
is a complicated proposal as many factors influence the creation and spread of 
surveillance apparatuses. But if advocates and political agents focus policy and 
law-making on consent and accountability as an inseparable pair of the surveil-
lance framework, any “free ride” (or free fall) monitoring can surely be slowed 
down and be made sustainable.
Concluding remarks
Unlike what happens in some papers, it is hardly conceivable a one-size-fits-
all solution here for what can be the sustainable evolution of mass surveillance in 
times to come. Nowadays, there are different degrees of integration of peoples 
and societies in the electronic world. Sooner or later, however, all communities 
will be online. This moment will mark an unparalleled cut with the time before 
computational technologies. Their lives and their culture will change. Culture is 
the result of human interactions, the product of human activity, rites, and tra-
ditions. Technological development is too powerful, too useful, and too helpful 
to be ignored in the design of human societies and their respective cultures. 
Perhaps even in the design of what it means to be human in the contemporary 
world of today and tomorrow.
What must be borne in mind is that surveillance is a political and social 
choice. Big data collection and general monitoring practices that reverse the 
order of police suspicion and gathering of evidence109 to a system of extracting 
every kind of intelligence and making everyone a person of interest first is also 
a choice. Surveillance110 is not an inevitability or a disgrace that cannot be con-
trolled, tamed, or even made transparent and accountable. It is true that some 
“surveillance systems have a life of their own – they creep into new areas, absorb 
more powers. The danger is that we are creating a world built on distrust in which 
there will be literally no escape from those who are watching us”111 – one of the 
many, quite real, risks ITs present112. But even if it becomes embedded into how 
we perceive the world from a young age and if we no longer can live without 
109 lyon (2015), p. 77.
110 Or “dataveillance”. See curious references in some literature, namely lyon (2015), p. 76; Goos, et al. 
(2015), p. 72, mentioning the coinage of the term by Roger Clarke in the 1980s; RaaB (2015), pp. 260 ff; or 
Fussey & coaFFee (2012), p. 207.
111 tudGe (2010), p. 146.
112 For an account of nine risks (nightmares) that fictional literature has presented in the last century to 
human rights, see saRtoR (2013), pp. 14 ff.
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these silent prying eyes, surveillance operations – regardless of their form, size, 
or shape (but particularly within large-scale programs) – can, should, and must 
depend on clear and informative processes; with the possibility of making the 
data accessible; and with watchers legally accountable, both internally and ex-
ternally, in due processes and through reasonable means in the hands of the 
surveilled individuals or their representatives. It is important to come back to 
ground notions, such as secrecy, discretionary powers, or security exceptions, 
and to re-think them through a careful balance of the interests at play. Especially 
when we can have glimpses of grimmer times and envisage a future of almost 
absolute monitoring – we are not treading (totally)113 in the dark here. We know 
where and how to go forward and so we only need to be intelligent about it.
A “free riding” surveillance attitude, either from governmental agencies or 
private parties, should be questioned at the local, regional, national, and even 
inter-state (international) level. Opinions will always diverge on this matter but 
the fact is that surveillance is bound to grow and expand with the evolution 
of technology. If this fact is a given – and it is, be sure of that – legislators and 
governments must tackle the issue keeping up with times and not pretending to 
deter the healthy development of technology.
Law-making will never keep pace with technological progress or surveillance 
techniques114, especially while they are still perceived in a traditional and target-
ed way. As such, this must be approached by tying the legitimacy of electronic 
surveillance to accountability of the monitoring parties115. In the surveillance dis-
course, the preference should be for: i ) quantitative and qualitative limitations of 
surveilling mechanisms; ii ) a constant reminder to citizens of vigilance demands 
in any given area; iii ) informing individuals when their data is retrieved and grant-
ing them access to the collected information under serious penalties; iv) trans-
parency of all processes – in itself a “prerequisite of accountability”116; v) legal 
and constitutional justification of the intrusion tied to de iure and de facto liability 
of the watchers; and vi ) preemptive scrutiny by independent boards. This last 
criterion is nothing extraordinary and would involve very similar requirements to 
independent regulatory agencies, such as those operating in the banking, ener-
gy, and environmental sectors.
All these demands are opposed to currently “tolerated” situations of indis-
criminate surveillance, unjustified vigilance, staged militant political activism, 
113 saRtoR (2013), p. 19.
114 For a careful assessment of the European legal standards in technological development, with a special 
focus on the surveillance programs by the British Government Communications Headquarters or the NSA, 
see BiGo, et al. (2013).
115 iRion (2015), p. 82.
116 Idem, p. 83.
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or disproportionate scrutinizing under misplaced counter-terrorism and fight 
against crime. As Irion put it, the “knowledge about the mere existence of blan-
ket surveillance schemes is not equally as compromising as it would be for tar-
geted actions. To the contrary, democratic societies should rethink the contours 
of secrecy, because the public sacrifice to national security must be transparent 
to its constituency”117. There are many dangers lurking from covert surveillance 
programs, particularly the persistence of social and racial ghettos by drafting 
inaccurate images of the “other”118.
In the end, states are responsible for surveillance as they set the boundaries 
for what is permissible119. No private or public monitoring should be permitted 
without public administrations being aware of it. This should extend as far as 
considering that foreign monitoring through private companies must never be 
unknown to host governments. And there ought to be legally binding internation-
al and regional commitments to the accountability of the parties and surveillance 
powers, not only political ones. However, as surveillance is part of the idea of 
(constant) democratic accountability, governments should not be accountable 
only in electoral moments. No surveillance operation should be (absolutely) cov-
ered against public, democratic, and transparent legal scrutiny in due time and 
by the appropriate agencies. Otherwise, there is a serious risk of erosion of the 
very democracy it is supposed to defend.
117 Idem, p. 84.
118 skoczylis (2017), pp. 119 ff.
119 An interesting “permissible limitations test” suggested by scheinin (2013), p. 588, would help main-
taining the inner core, or forum internum, of the rights to privacy and data protection within the logic of 
surveillance programs. Although the author is referring to international human rights law, it could easily be 
mimicked at the regional and national levels.
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